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Abstract  
We analyse the effects of imports on employment and earnings by distinguishing 
between import competition in final products and firms’ use of imports in 
production (offshoring). We use Finnish worker-firm data merged with product 
-level trade data. We focus on Chinese imports and instrument them by changes 
in China’s share of world exports. Both types of importing increase the job loss 
risk for all workers and, in particular, for workers in production occupations. An 
increase in import competition has larger negative effects than an increase in 
offshoring. Production workers suffer the largest earnings losses, while for high 
-skilled workers the wage-effect is positive. 
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1 Introduction
There has been a profound change in world trade in the last two decades. Falling trans-
port costs, improvements in information and communication technologies, liberalized FDI
regimes, and foremost the integration of China in the global economy have increased both
import competition and o¤shoring of production in developed countries. The labor market
consequences of these two phenomena may be very di¤erent. While import competition
is expected to crowd out domestic production, the e¤ect of imported intermediates on
domestic production is ambiguous. On one hand, an increased use of imported interme-
diates substituting for domestic production may cause displacements and lower wages in
domestic rms (Feenstra and Hanson 1996, 1999). On the other hand, the use of imported
intermediates may improve rm productivity and competitiveness allowing the o¤shoring
rm to expand and pay higher wages (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006, 2008). Most
previous studies have focused on the e¤ects of either import competition or o¤shoring on
the labor market neglecting the possibly di¤erential impact of the other channel.1
In this paper, we examine the impact of increased import penetration from China
on employment and earnings of individuals over a short to medium run in a small open
economy, namely Finland. We extend the current literature on labor market impacts of im-
porting by distinguishing between the e¤ects of an import shock on nal product demand
(import competition) and an import shock on the rms own use of intermediates (o¤-
shoring intermediate inputs), and by focusing on individual-level employment outcomes.
We argue that import shocks are expected to have a more instant impact on employment
than on wages in countries where labour markets are characterized by a relatively weak
employment protection and centralized and slow wage adjustments.2 Moreover, we dis-
1E.g. Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price (2016), Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013, 2015), Autor,
Dorn, Hanson and Song (2014), Balsvik, Jensen and Salvanes (2015), Dauth, Findelsen and Suedekum
(2015), Ebenstein et al. (2014) analyze the e¤ects of import competition measured as import penetration
at industry level. Ashournia, Munch and Nguyen (2014) use rm-product-specic imports to analyze the
wage e¤ecsts of import competition. Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2014) use information on
rm-specic imports to study the e¤ects of rm-level o¤shoring. Kovak, Oldenski and Sly (2015) and
Becker, Ekhom and Muendler (2013) dene o¤shoring using information of a¢ liate employment changes.
2Balsvik, Jensen and Salvanes (2015) make the same point in their paper where they nd clear employ-
ment but no wage e¤ects of import competition from China to regional labor markets in Norway. They
explain the lack of wage e¤ects by Nordic welfare state and centralized wage bargaining.
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tinguish the impact of trade shocks by the workerseducational skills and occupation to
understand which worker groups are a¤ected the most.
We focus on Chinese imports for two reasons. First, Chinese imports to Finland consist
both of nal products and intermediate inputs, which allows us to analyse the shocks to
both type of imports. Second, we follow an instrumental variable approach similar to one
used in a few recent studies and we exploit the fact that the rapid increase in Chinas
share of world manufacturing exports in the 2000s arguably appears to be driven by two
exogenous factors;3 by changes in domestic policies impacting Chinas transition to a more
market-oriented economy4 and changes in trade policies. We construct an instrument for
the Chinese imports to Finland based on imports from China to other EU countries.5 For
the increase in imports from China to other EU countries to be a valid instrument for
rmsimporting decisions in Finland, it is required that the growth is driven by supply-
side factors in China and not by factors related to the demand for the products. Instead
of using absolute values of Chinese imports to other EU countries, we construct a measure
which relates Chinese imports to other EU countries to the world imports to other EU
countries at the product-level. With the relative measure, we aim at isolating the China-
specic variation in the EU import growth from the variation due to demand shocks.
We use linked worker-rm data which includes all rms and the total of the working
age population from Finland for 1998-2009. We match detailed rm-level data on imports
and used intermediate goods to this data. The data allows us to identify the imports
used by a rm in its production and imports that compete with the rms nal output
and construct separate rm-specic measures for o¤shoring and import competition. We
can also construct instrumental variables for Chinese import competition and o¤shoring
that more precisely capture the exogenous shocks that individual rms are exposed to.
Finally, the data allows us to follow individuals as they move to new employers or out of
labour markets to observe their earnings and how individual-level characteristics such as
3Chinas share of world manufacturing exports have grown from 5% in 2000 to 16% in 2014, at the
same time as the developed countries have experienced large losses of jobs in manufacturing industries.
World Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/).
4See e.g. Naughton (2007); Hsieh and Klenow (2009); Hsieh and Ossa (2011), Bloom, Draca and Van
Reenen (2016), Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012).
5Our identication strategy is related to methods used in Autor et al (2014) and Bloom et al (2016).
3
education and occupation interact with the e¤ect of importing on the worker-level labour
market outcomes.
Our ndings suggest that both o¤shoring and import competition increase the like-
lihood of job loss and non-employment, and import competition seems to have larger
negative e¤ects than o¤shoring.6 Doubling the mean level of o¤shoring to China increases
the risk of separation from initial rm within two years by 4.8 percent, while the same
relative increase in import competition from China increases the risk of separation by 13.5
percent. The e¤ects on probability of employment are smaller, but larger for medium-
skilled than for low- and high-skilled workers. While rm-level o¤shoring increases the
risk of separation for high-skilled workers, it has a considerable smaller negative e¤ect on
the probability of being employed. This suggests that the high-skilled workers are more
likely to move to a new employment after leaving their initial employer. When distin-
guishing workers by occupation, we nd that workers in production occupations su¤er
from the largest negative e¤ects on employment outcomes due to increased o¤shoring and
import competition. The earnings e¤ects are more heterogeneous; rm-level o¤shoring and
import competition have a similar negative impact on the annual earnings of production
workers as on their employment outcomes, but for the high-skilled the e¤ects on earnings
are positive and the opposite to the employment e¤ects.
By focusing on the employment e¤ects of importing for individuals, this study con-
tributes to the previous literature where the majority of studies analyses the e¤ects of
trade shocks on earnings and wage premiums for di¤erent tasks and skills (e.g. Firpo et
al., 2011, Baumgarten et al., 2013, Hummels et al., 2014, Ebenstein et al., 2014) or on
employment at a more aggregated level. Only a few previous studies have examined the
e¤ect of imports on worker outcomes using individual level data. Autor et al. (2014) nd
that individuals who in 1991 worked in manufacturing industries that experienced a high
subsequent import growth from China garner lower cumulative earnings, face an elevated
risk of obtaining public disability benets, and spend less time working for their initial
employers and in their initial sector. Hummels et al. (2014) estimate the wage e¤ects of
6This argument is based on comparing how much a 100% increase in the sample mean value of the
measure a¤ects outcomes.
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rm-level o¤shoring using Danish data on workers in rms which both import and export.
In this way, they focus on the e¤ects of within-rm changes in the intensity of trade. They
nd that within job spells, o¤shoring tends to increase the high-skilled wage and decrease
the low-skilled wage, but the net trade e¤ect of o¤shoring and exporting varies substan-
tially within the same skill type and, conditional on skill, the wage e¤ect of o¤shoring
varies across occupational characteristics.
In our analysis, we choose an approach which avoids restricting the sample of workers
by employment or rm status. We include both stayers and leavers and rms which do
not import initially or later in the period of the study to assess the overall impact of o¤-
shoring and import competition on individual-level employment and earnings outcomes.
In the more recent international trade literature focusing on o¤shoring, a distinction be-
tween skills and tasks is highly relevant since it has been argued that other characteristics
than skill intensity determine whether job tasks are o¤shorable (Blinder, 2006).7 In par-
ticular, routine tasks and tasks that do not require personal interaction are more easily
o¤shored (Levy and Murmane, 2004, Leamer and Storper, 2001, Blinder, 2006). The
more recent studies, (e.g. Becker et al. 2013, Ebenstein et al. 2014 and Hummels et
al. 2014), nd that skills and occupation are important characteristics in distinguishing
the impact of trade exposure on earnings. In addition, Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen
(2016) show that an increased import competition from China causes an increased tech-
nological change within rms and reallocates employment towards more technologically
advanced rms, thus leading to a fall in employment for low-skilled workers. To the best
of our knowledge, Mion and Zhu (2013) is the only empirical study which uses both the
industry-level measure for import competition and the rm-level measure for o¤shoring
distinguishing between o¤shoring of nished and intermediate goods. They focus on the
e¤ects of importing on rm-level outcomes and nd that the industry-level import compe-
tition from China reduces rm employment growth and induces skill upgrading in low-tech
rms, while o¤shoring of nished goods to China actually increases rmsprobability of
7The international trade literature on o¤shoring initially focused on whether low or highly skilled
labour is more o¤shorable (e.g Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999; Ekholm and Hakkala, 2006; Falk and
Koebel, 2002; Hijzen et al., 2005; Strauss-Kahn, 2004).
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survival.
Our paper is also related to the literature which analyses the impact of permanent
job loss on individuals.8 Only a few papers have examined the relationship between trade
and job losses. Kletzer (2001, 2002) nds no association between imported intermediate
goods and displacement rates in US industries, while Munch (2010) nds that rm-level
outsourcing is associated with a higher unemployment risk for low-skilled workers. We
apply the set up from the job displacement literature (e.g. Davis and von Wachter 2011)
to analyse the e¤ects of imports on employment at the individual level, and how workers
adjust to these changes. Following individuals over some years after a trade shock is highly
important since some time may be required before the potential worker-level consequences
from increased trade emerge. Moreover, by instrumenting the import variables, our paper
is the rst that asks the question of how much do rm-level changes in o¤shoring or
import competition increase the risk of job loss, and how do the e¤ects vary by workers
characteristics.
We begin by providing a theoretical motivation in Section II and analyzing the trends
in trade exposure and labor markets in Finland from the end of 1990s onwards in Section
III. Section IV presents the data and the empirical framework. Section V presents the
results. Section VI concludes.
2 Theoretical Motivation
As a theoretical motivation, we begin from a framework for a two-sector economy by
Autor et al. (2014). In this setting, one of the domestic sectors is directly exposed to
trade shocks in the rest of the world and the other is not. Trade shocks are supposed to
be caused by productivity growth abroad, increasing the supply of products that compete
with domestic production. In this setting, the trade shock will manifest itself as a fall in
product demand in the economys trade exposed industry, thus causing a reduction in the
industrys demand for labour and an adjustment which goes through changes in nominal
8See e.g. Jacobson et al. (1993) and Couch et al. (2010). For Nordic evidence, see Eliason and Storrie
(2006) for Sweden, Huttunen, Moen and Salvanes (2011) for Norway, and Huttunen and Kellokumpu
(2016) for Finland.
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wages. Labour is perfectly mobile between sectors, equalizing the wages for similarly
skilled workers in the long run, but not necessarily in the short run.9
In this paper, we assume similar trade shocks as those in Autor et al. (2013) arising
from falling trade costs and productivity growth abroad, thus increasing the supply of
foreign produced goods. We assume that trade shocks have an impact on rms and labour
demand in the exposed industry through three channels. First, the increasing supply of
competing imports will cause a fall in product demand in the economys trade exposed in-
dustry and a reduction in the industrys demand for labour (the demand e¤ect).10 Second,
the increasing supply of foreign produced goods will induce rms to substitute domesti-
cally produced intermediates with imported intermediates. This second channel of trade
shocks has an impact on the rmsand the industrys demand for labour in two di¤erent
ways: 1) the demand for labour may fall if imported intermediates replace domestic labour
either in the o¤shoring rm or in the domestic downstream producers of intermediates (the
substitution e¤ect) and 2) the demand for labour may increase if the use of cheaper im-
ported intermediates increases the productivity in the o¤shoring rms (the productivity
e¤ect).11
In the short-run, the labour market outcome depends on how the negative demand and
substitution e¤ects counterbalance the positive productivity e¤ect. In the transition to a
new long-run equilibrium, all three e¤ects may be active. The demand and substitution
e¤ects release labour in the exposed industry which, in setting of Autor et al., would
reduce the nominal wages until enough workers move to the nonexposed sector. They
state that if there are frictions in moving labor between industries, adjustment will be slow,
forcing nominal wages in the exposed industry to remain below those in the nonexposed
industry during the transition. We recognize that the demand and substitution e¤ects
put pressure on the nominal wages in the exposed industry, but if wages will not readily
adjust downwards, the adjustment could force some workers into unemployment. When
9Non-labor factors of production are implicitly assumed to be immobile between sectors, as is the case
in the specic factors model (Feenstra, 2004).
10This e¤ect is the same as in Autor et al. (2013) paper.
11The labour supply e¤ect and the productivity e¤ect are modelled in the general equilibrium framework
by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
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wages eventually adjust, workers will nd new employment either in the exposed industry
or in the nonexposed industry. The negative e¤ects may be mitigated or counterbalanced
by the positive productivity e¤ect of o¤shoring, which allows rms to expand and employ
more workers.
The resulting negative e¤ects on employment are expected to be attributable entirely
to the transitional phase, but they are increasing in the extent of wage stickiness and labor
immobility across sectors in both the short and medium run. We suppose that there is an
adjustment process with sticky wages, forcing some displaced workers into unemployment
until the adjustment to a new long-run equilibrium has been reached. These assumptions
t the Finnish labour market better since its wage determination is relatively centralized
and thus, neither rm-specic nor industry-specic shocks have an immediate impact on
wages in Finland.
In Finland, the unions negotiate wage contracts with employer organizations separately
in each industry, but these negotiations are typically co-ordinated by central organizations,
thus leading to rather similar pay rises in di¤erent industries. As in the other Nordic
countries, union density is very high in Finland (71% in 2005)12 and the union wage
contracts are also extended to non-unionized workers. Therefore, union contracts cover
more than 90% of the workers, which is high but comparable to other Nordic countries
and countries such as France, Italy and Spain (Venn, 2009). The employment protection
legislation may also a¤ect the employment adjustment of workers through dismissal costs.
However, the Finnish labour law is not particularly strict. According to the OECD index
of the stringency of the employment protection legislation from 2008, Finland is close to
the OECD average (2.3 versus 2.2 on a scale from 0 to 6, with 6 indicating the most
stringent legislation). In sum, the Finnish labour market is characterized by a centralized
wage setting and relatively weak employment protection. These features of the Finnish
labour market motivate us to focus on the employment outcomes of trade shocks. We also
estimate the e¤ects on annual earnings and hourly wages in order to relate our analysis to
the recent literature on the e¤ects of imports on individual-level labour market outcomes.
Before presenting the econometric model, we analyze the changes in the import exposure
1270.7 % in Denmark, 76.5% in Sweden and 54.5% in Norway in 2005 (OECD Stat).
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and manufacturing employment from the end of 1990s onwards.
3 Trade Exposure in Finland
In Figure 1, we plot imports from China and the manufacturing employment share in Fin-
land and the U.S. over the 1990-2009 period. We note that Chinese import penetration
increased dramatically in the U.S. after China joined WTO in 2001 and until the nan-
cial crisis. The Chinese import penetration in Finland starts increasing in 2002, one year
after Chinas accession to the WTO, but does not make a strong growth spurt until 2004
onwards. This suggests that the Chinese import shock hits Finland later than the U.S..
The period of strong import growth from China coincides with decreasing manufacturing
employment as the share of total employment in both countries.13 Although the trend in
manufacturing employment share is similar in the two countries, the level of the manufac-
turing employment share is about 10 percentage points higher in Finland, thus suggesting
that Finland is still more dependent on manufacturing than the U.S..
Figure 1 here
It is possible that the increasing Chinese import penetration coincides with other sig-
nicant changes in imports from low and middle income countries to Finland. We note
two important facts in Figure 2, which plots the shares of imports to Finland from the
most important low and lower middle income source countries.14 First, Chinese imports do
not seem to have crowded out imports from other important low or middle income source
countries. We only observe a smaller negative change in the Estonian import share after
2005. Second, Russia is the most important source country and, in addition to China, a
13Due to a deep recession, caused by a banking crisis and a collapse of export to the former Soviet
Union, the total employment rst decreased by 16% between 1990 and 1996 and then increased by 24%
between 1996 and 2008 in Finland (computed from STAN Database, OECD). The large drop in the total
employment explains why manufacturing employment as a share of the total employment stayed at a
more stable level in the early 1990s. (See more about the economic crisis in Gorodnichenko, Mendoza,
and Tesar 2012).
14We dene the group of low and lower middle income countries by the denitions of the World Bank
for 2001.
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large contributor to import growth in the 2000s. Until its collapse in 1991, the former
Soviet Union was an important Finnish trading partner. A decade after the collapse of
Soviet trade, imports from Russia started to grow again; the growth is particularly strong
from the mid 2000s until the nancial crisis in 2008.
Figure 2 here
In Figure 3, we plot the composition and the changes of imports between 2001-2007
from the two most important low and lower middle income source countries, China and
Russia. The gure conrms that the industries with large increases in imports are dis-
tinctly di¤erent between China and Russia. Imports from Russia have grown in raw
materials and basic manufactures; Petroleum, Basic metals and Basic chemicals; while
imports from China have grown in manufactured goods, particularly in TV, Radio and
Telecom Equipment but also in Machinery and Equipment, Computers, Electrical Ma-
chinery and Equipment and Textiles, Clothing and Leather. Moreover, the plot reveals
that the structure of the Chinese and Russian imports di¤ers considerably. The most im-
portant import goods from Russia are either raw materials or basic manufactured goods,
in particular Petroleum, Metal and Metal products, Chemicals and Wood, while the most
important import goods from China are manufactured goods, in particular Machinery and
Equipment, Computers, Electrical Machinery and Equipment, TV, Radio and Telecom
Equipment and Textiles, Clothing and Leather.15 Thus, this gure suggests that Chinese
imports consist of processed intermediate goods or nal goods to a larger extent than
Russian imports.
Figure 3 here
The stylized facts suggest that Finland has experienced a substantial change in the
magnitude of Chinese import penetration in the 2000s. There has also been a strong
increase in imports from Russia, but the observed di¤erences in the composition of Chi-
15A further investigation of the Russian imports from the industry groups Metal and Metal products
and Chemicals reveals that there are two industries that account for the largest share of imports in these
groups, namely Basic Metals and Basic Chemicals.
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nese and Russian imports give us reason to expect that the changes in Chinese imports
constitute a signicant trade shock to the Finnish manufacturing sector, while Russian
imports do not. In the econometric analysis, we will focus on the e¤ects of Chinese import
penetration on manufacturing employment and wages in Finland. In the introduction, we
argued that the rapid Chinese export growth on the world market in the 2000s may be
regarded as an exogenous trade shock which appears to be driven by two internal factors;
changes in trade policies and in domestic policies which have an impact on production
conditions.
4 Data and Estimation Strategy
This section introduces our main sources of data, our trade measures and the estimation
strategy.
4.1 Data Sources
We use a register-based Finnish Longitudinal Employer Employee Database (FLEED)
and Structure of Earnings data for the period 1999-2009, both from Statistics Finland. To
construct measures of o¤shoring and import competition and their instrumental variables,
we use rm-level trade data from Finnish Customs, combined with rm-level intermedi-
ate product data from Statistics Finland and data for commodity imports from the UN
COMTRADE database. The data sets are linked together with unique rm identica-
tion numbers. The FLEED includes all individuals and contains detailed information on
individual characteristics including education, occupation, annual wages, gender, family
status and previous work history. This data allows us to follow individuals over time and
to derive outcome variables of employment status and annual earnings. The Structure of
Earnings data provides us more detailed information about earnings, in particular, hourly
wages, but does not include all workers.16 In the econometric analysis, we use both an-
16Workers in rms with less than ve employees and workers in the private sector with an employment
spell starting or ending in the middle of a data collection month, and workers with no employment are
excluded.
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nual earnings and hourly wages as earnings outcome variables. The rm-level information
comes from nancial statement panel. The panel includes variables such as value added,
capital stock (book value), number of employees, wages, sales, and industry.
The rm-level trade data, which we use to construct measures of o¤shoring and import
competition, is available at the level of the 8-digit Combined Nomenclature (CN8) by
country of origin from 1999 onwards.17 Stemming from compulsory registration in Finnish
Customs, data on imports from outside the EU consists of all trade transactions. Data for
trade transactions to other EU countries is available for all rms with an annual import
to all other EU countries above 100 000 euro.18 According to information from Finnish
Customs, the data incorporates about 96.5 percent of the total imports from other EU
countries. To construct instruments for our o¤shoring and import competition variables,
we collect trade data for EU countries at the level of the 6-digit Harmonized System
product categories (HS6) for commodity imports from the UNCOMTRADE database. For
the o¤shoring instrument, we also use the rm-level information for intermediate products
(imported and domestic) that we obtain from Statistics Finlands Industrial Ouput data
for manufacturing rms. We aggregate the rm-specic information of used intermediate
products to 4-digit level of industries (NACE rev 1.1.) for our purposes.19
We restrict our analysis to manufacturing rms which have a minimum of 20 employ-
ees at least one year during the studied period and to the individuals aged 20-55 years
employed at these rms in a base year. We dene 2000-2006 as base years, and follow
individuals three years after the base year in the econometric analysis. The trade informa-
tion is from year t (2001-2007). To avoid the results to be driven by the Financial Crisis
starting in 2008, we choose 2006 as the last base year included into the analysis.
The occupational codes in our data are from two di¤erent sources. The FLEED sta-
tistics has three-digit ISCO-88 occupational code information for all employed individuals
17The Combined Nomenclature, used by EU countries, is an extended version based on Harmonized
Commodity Description and Coding System (Harmonized System, or HS).
18EU countries may set this threshold themselves. 100 000 euro is a threshold applied in several EU
countries.
19We use data at the 4-digit level of industries rather than the more disaggregated 6-digit level of
product classes (prodcom PC6) since the concordance between PC6 and HS6/CN6 (international trade
data) has many one-to-many and many-to-many translations between the codes, see Van Beveren, Bernard
and Vandenbussche (2012).
12
in the years 2000, and 2004-2009. For the years missing occupational code in FLEED,
we rst complement the occupational codes from Structure of Earnings data which has
three-digit ISCO codes for the entire time period, 1999-2009, but does not cover all indi-
viduals in the sample. For the individuals missing an occupational code both in FLEED
and Structure of Earnings data (2001-2003), we enter an occupational code which is the
nearest non-missing year observation.
In our econometric specications, we distinguish workers by the level of education and
occupation. We use three educational categories; low-skilled workers have lower secondary
education (9 years of education), medium-skilled upper secondary education (12 years) and
high skilled tertiary education (>12 years), and six occupational categories; clerks, service
workers, operators and assemblers, trades and construction workers, professional workers
and managerial workers (see Table B4 in Appendix B for the denitions). The occupational
categories are chosen to distinguish di¤erent dimensions of task content of jobs that are
relevant for analyzing the e¤ects of increased importing.20 In particular, routine tasks and
tasks that do not require personal interaction can more easily be o¤shored (see e.g. Levy
and Murmane, 2004, Leamer and Storper, 2001 and Blinder, 2006). O¤shoring of such
tasks may actually reduce job opportunities in middle-skilled production occupations in
manufacturing. Low-skilled workers, carrying out routine manual and cognitive tasks in
service and clerical occupations such as cleaning, cashiers, sales sta¤ and plumbers, on
the other hand, are less likely to be replaced by machines and computers, and are also
much less susceptible to o¤shoring if their job tasks have a geographical attachment to
other operations and customers. Moreover, non-routine cognitive personal and analytical
tasks, typically carried out by professionals and managers, are described as such that they
cannot easily be codied and performed by computers.21 For the same reasons, they most
likely require some geographical proximity to the other operations and cannot easily be
o¤shored.
20We use occupational categories rather than measures of task content of occupations to maintain
transparency in the analysis.
21For the purpose of studying how computers have a¤ected relative demand for job tasks, Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) dene job tasks into the seven categories; non-routine cognitive personal, non-routine
manual physical, non-routine cognitive analytical, non-routine manual personal, routine cognitive, routine
manual and o¤shorable.
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4.2 Dening and Measuring Trade Shocks
As motivated in previous sections, the e¤ects of import competition may di¤er from the
e¤ects of the rms own imports of intermediate goods (o¤shoring). In the empirical
analysis, we distinguish between the impacts of the rms own o¤shoring and the impacts
of import competition.
We dene our o¤shoring measure as narrow o¤shoring including imported goods from
the industry of the importing rm, i.e. a rms purchases of imported goods produced
in the same industry (at the two-digit level of NACE rev 1.1).22 Dening o¤shoring in
terms of imported own-industry goods captures o¤shoring caused by outsource o¤shoring
to external foreign suppliers and in-house o¤shoring to foreign a¢ liates to the extent
that these phenomena involve imports back to the home country for further processing
or resales.23 We relate rm is own industry imports to total production to control for
changes in imports due changes in the rm size and dene rm-level o¤shoring shock as a
change in the intensity of imported intermediates in total production:
COFFijt =
P
k2jm
China
ijt
yit
(1)
where
P
k2jm
China
ijt is the imported goods k from industry j from China and used by rm
i from industry j (two-digit NACE rev 1.1) and yit is rm i0s production.
In order to separate the rms own use of imported goods (o¤shoring) from the total
import of goods (import competition), we construct a rm-specic measure of import
competition. We deduct rm is own imports of goods from industry j (at the three-digit
level of NACE rev 1.1)
P
k2jm
China
ijt from the total imports of goods from industry j in
China to Finland, MChinajt :
22Feenstra and Hanson (1999) distinguish between narrow and broad o¤shoring. Narrow o¤shoring
only includes imported intermediate inputs from the importing industry, i.e. an industrys purchases of
imported inputs produced in the same industry. Broad o¤shoring also includes imported non-energy
inputs from all other industries. They prefer the narrow to the broad measure, since it is closer to the
phenomenon of fragmentation and vertical specialization that takes place within industries.
23The measure does not capture o¤shoring of the nal stages of production or other production that is
not shipped back to the home country for further processing.
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CIPijt =
MChinajt  
P
k2jm
China
ijt
Mjt  
P
k2jmijt + Yjt
(2)
where Mjt are the total import of goods from industry j to Finland,
PChina
k2j mijt are the
imported goods from industry j used by rm i from industry j from China,
P
k2jmijt are
the all imported goods k from industry j used by rm i in industry j, and Yjt is the total
domestic sales by rms in industry j in Finland.24
Before presenting our individual-level specication, we rst analyse how changes in
o¤shoring and import competition from China are related to di¤erent outcome variables
at the rm-level. Since the shocks are dened at the rm-level, we want to describe
how these shocks are correlated with employment, sales and exporting of the rms. The
results for rm-level FE-estimations in Table A1 in Appendix A suggest that increased
o¤shoring from China is associated with a decrease in rm-level sales, while increased
import competition from China is associated with a decrease in rm-level employment
and sales. Further, neither of the import measures is associated with changes in the
export share or the educational skill shares.
4.3 Individual-Level Specication
To analyse the responses to Chinese import shocks at the worker level, we construct a
sample of workers who were employed in a manufacturing rm at the end of a base year,
t   1; (years 2000-2006). We follow the workers to years t, t + 1 and t + 2 regardless
whether they remain in the labour force or not. We use three di¤erent outcome measures:
1) employed in same rm, which is an indicator that has the value of one if individual h
did not separate from rm i between t 1 and t(+k); 2) employment, which is an indicator
of whether the individual is employed in year t(+k), and; 3) annual earnings (including
zeros) in year t(+k), where k = 0; 1;or 2: Table A2 in Appendix A reports the means of
background and outcome variables for this sample.
24This rm-specic measure similar to the import competition measure is used by Ashournia et al.
(2014) by excluding the imports that are used by the rm i as intermediates and, by denition, do not
compete with rm is production.
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To analyse how rm-level o¤shoring or rm-specic import competition a¤ects worker-
level outcomes in di¤erent t (+k) during and following the import shock, we estimate the
following specication:
Yht+k = X
0
ht 1 + Z
0
it 1 + 1COFFijt + (2CIPijt) + hi + t + "hit (3)
where Yht is an indicator variable for the worker-level outcome for individual h in
year t+k: Xht 1 is a vector of observable worker characteristics from the pre-shock period
t 1. These include age, age squared, tenure dummies (2, 3, 4-10, >10 years), a dummy for
having children aged below seven years, a dummy for having children aged below 18 years
and interaction variables between respective two former variables and a female dummy.
Zit 1 is the vector of rm variables, which includes a log of number of employees in the
main specication25 and hi is the individual-base-year-rm specic xed e¤ect (initial
job spell xed e¤ect) and t is the time-specic dummy variable. Our main variables
of interest are rm-level Chinese o¤shoring, COFFijt, and rm-specic Chinese import
competition, CIPijt. We measure o¤shoring and import competition in year t which is
the year after the base year.
We estimate the model by OLS as a linear probability model with individual-base-year-
rm specic xed e¤ects separately for years t, t+1, and t+2. By including the individual-
base-year-rm xed e¤ects, we can control for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity
between rms and individuals.26 The model with rm-individual xed e¤ects captures
how a change in imports within the base-year rm a¤ects the probability of separation
(the probability of employment, annual earnings) for the given individual. Note that the
base-year rm for each individual is the rm where the individual was working at the end
of the year t 1. We do not require individuals to remain employed in these rms in years
t, t + 1, and t + 2, i.e. when the outcome is measured. This way, we can estimate the
impact of the import shocks on employment outcomes, without restricting the analysis
to a selective group of workers who keep their jobs. Our approach is related to that of
25We also estimate regressions including rm export share variable in period t to control for changes in
labour demand arising from export shocks. The results are not a¤ected in any important way.
26In section 5.3 we report the results of model without xed e¤ects, and with base-year rm xed e¤ects.
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Autor et al. (2013) where workers are attached to pre-shock industries and Hummels et al.
(2014) where workers are attached to pre-shock employers and it is also related to Walker
(2013) and Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) using longitudinal data.
4.4 Instruments
An obvious concern with the importing measures is that the rms importing decisions
are jointly determined with their employment decisions. In order to investigate the causal
e¤ect of importing on earnings and the employment of workers, we employ an instrumental
variable approach. The approach requires that the instrument is correlated with rms
importing decisions (changes in o¤shoring), but it should not be correlated with factors
that inuence their employment decisions, productivity or demand for nal products in
any other way.
We exploit the fact that the growth of Chinese export appears largely to be driven
by changes in trade policies and domestic policies in China.27 In particular, industrial
production increased rapidly as a result of improving productivity, increased capital accu-
mulation, migration to urban areas, and enhancements in infrastructure. On January 1,
2001, China joined WTO which gave an additional boost to the Chinese manufacturing
industries. The WTOmembership implied that China committed to a step-wise relaxation
over 7,000 tari¤s, quotas and other trade barriers over a transition period of 2001-2007.
Dismantling of import barriers gave the Chinese importers better access to foreign inputs.
In 2005, an extensive import quota system called the Multiber Arrangement, set by EU,
US and Canada on Chinese imports in 1974, was phased out and there was also a change
in exporting law in China, which made it easier to obtain an exporting license for certain
products. Altogether, the changes in the trade regime beneted the production of goods
that depended on imported intermediates and that were exported.
We base our identication strategy on the growth in Chinese imports to countries that
were EU members before 2000, excluding Finland, at the three-digit level of manufacturing
27Autor et al (2014) use variation in Chinese export supply to high-income countries, Hummels et
al (2014) variation in world export supply and Bloom et al (2016) use variation due to the removal of
product-specic quotas following Chinas entry to the World Trade Organization in 2001.
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industries (three-digit NACE rev 1.1).28 For the increase in Chinese imports to be a valid
instrument for rmsimporting decisions in Finland, it is required that the growth is driven
by supply side factors in China and not by factors related to demand of the products. A
potential threat to our identication strategy is that product demand shocks are correlated
across EU countries, implying that our instrumental variables (IV) estimates may be
contaminated by the correlation between import growth and the unobserved components
of product demand. This would tend to bias a negative impact of trade exposure on
earnings and employment toward zero. To neutralize the potential demand-side factors,
we construct measures which relate the Chinese imports of products k from industry j
to EU countries to the aggregate world imports of products k from industry j to the EU
countries in year t: In this way, we aim at excluding the e¤ect of world demand shocks
from the China-specic variation in export supply.29 While using import statistics, we
name the instruments as China relative export supply, CRES:
To create an instrument for o¤shoring (importing of intermediate inputs), we weight
the imports of product k from China with the average share of the intermediate product
(imported or domestic) in the total use of inputs by rms i in industry j in the presample
years of 1998-1999 skj;30
CRES_INPjt =
X
k
skj
CESEUkjt
WESEUkjt
where CESEUkjt is Chinas imports of products k from industry j (three-digit NACE rev
1.1) in year t to EU countries and WESEUkjt is the sum of the world imports of products k
from industry j to EU countries, both excluding the imports to Finland.31 The instrument
will capture the variations in Chinese imports that are caused by exogenous factors (trade
28The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK.
29We will also check the robustness of the results when using an instrument that exploits the absolute
variation in Chinese exports (as in Hummels et al. 2014) and using aggregate world export supply of
products k from industry j as the nominator. It is important to note that part of the variation in the
latter may also reect negative or positive import shocks from other countries.
30We obtain the information for intermediate inputs from Industrial output data for manufacturing
rms. Weights are computed as shares of products (dened at 4-digit level of industries) in total use of
intermediates at the 3-digit level of industries (NACE rev 1.1).
31As a measure of export supply we use imports reported by EU countries.
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policies and Chinas domestic policies) a¤ecting Chinas relative share the world exports
of the product k from industry j. However, for the exclusion restriction to hold, we also
need to assume that the average presample input structure (the initial share of product
k in the input mix) in an industry is not correlated with employment changes through
any other channel than through the changes in imports. We argue that industry average
weights constitute a better guarantee for this than rm-specic weights.
For the import competition measure, we use Chinas unweighted relative export supply
at the industry-level as the instrument
CRES_INDjt =
CESEUkjt
WESEUkjt
where CESEUkjt and WES
EU
kjt are dened as above. Thus, we exploit the same source
of variation in both instruments, but the di¤erence is that the o¤shoring instrument is
weighted by the initial input structure of the industry. For this reason, we estimate
separately the impact of import competition and o¤shoring when using the IV strategy.
5 The E¤ect of O¤shoring and Import competition
on Worker Outcomes
5.1 Employment Outcomes
We begin by estimating equation (3) including all workers employed in the rms in the
base year and using the two outcome variables: 1) employed in the same rm as in period
t  1 and; 2) employment.32 The specication includes worker base-year rm xed e¤ects
and the standard errors are clustered at the period t  1 rm level.
Table 1 reports the results for the xed e¤ect and xed e¤ect-IV estimations for the
two import shocks, o¤shoring and import competition, the three time periods t; t+1 and
t + 2, and the two outcome variables. The period t e¤ect tells us whether an increase
in the rms o¤shoring while employed in the initial rm a¤ects the likelihood that the
32Table A2 in Appendix A shows mean values for the di¤erent outcome variables.
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individual is still employed in the rm (or employed anywhere). By looking at the e¤ects
in the next two years (t+ 1 and t+ 2), we want to examine whether changes in the level
of o¤shoring (import competition) a¤ect the separation probability immediately or with
a time lag.
The xed-e¤ect estimates in columns 1 to 3 in Panels A and B of Table 1 indicate that
both increased rm-level o¤shoring and import competition are associated with a reduced
probability of an individual being employed in the same rm in period t: The negative
e¤ect of o¤shoring is not statistically signicant until time period t+2. This indicates that
o¤shoring has an e¤ect after an adjustment period. In order to make the estimated e¤ects
of o¤shoring and import competition on employment outcomes comparable, we compute
relative e¤ects for an increase equal to the sample mean of the respective measure. An
increase equal to the sample mean of o¤shoring to China (the mean 0.45 percent doubles
to 0.90 percent) is associated with a -0.69 percent decrease in the probability of being
employed in the same rm in year t + 2:33 The e¤ect of import competition is largest in
the rst year. An increase equal to the sample mean level of import competition from
China (the mean 1.25 doubles to 2.5) is associated with a 1.07 percent decrease in the
probability of being employed in the same rm in year t.34
In Panels D and E we report results using employment as an outcome variable. Both
o¤shoring and import competition have a larger negative association with the probability
of remaining employed in the initial rm than with the probability of being employed. This
suggests that part of the workers leaving rms with increased imports immediately nd
new employment elsewhere. Panel C and F show the results from estimating a specication
which includes both the o¤shoring and the import competition measure. The estimates
largely remain the same when both measures are included.
Table 1 here
Next, we analyse the results for the xed-e¤ect-IV estimations. The rst-stage es-
33The percentage e¤ect is computed as -0.011*0.45/0.7152*100=-0.692. The means are reported in
Table A2 in Appendix A.
34The percentage e¤ect is computed as -0.0079*1.25/0.9205*100=-1.073.
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timates for the instrumental variables are reported in column 4 in Table 1. As ex-
pected, the weighted and unweighted Chinese relative export supply, CRES_INPjt and
CRES_INDjt; increase o¤shoring at the rm level and import competition at the indus-
try level, respectively. In columns 5 to 7 in Table 1, we report the second stage estimates
for the two import variables. When instrumenting o¤shoring and import competition, we
nd the e¤ect on the probability of being employed in the same rm to remain negative,
but the e¤ect is larger in magnitude than in the FE estimations. This reects the positive
selection bias in our FE estimations. Workers in importing rms have lower separation
probabilities than workers in other rms. This is consistent with the idea that importing
may be associated with other factors that have a positive inuence on rm growth. The
results indicate that an increase equal to the mean level of o¤shoring to China increases
the probability of the worker leaving the initial employer by 4.8 percent, while an equally
large increase in import competition increases the probability by 13.5 percent in t + 2:
Both o¤shoring and import competition have also a negative e¤ect on the likelihood of
remaining employed, but the e¤ects are considerably smaller and less precise than the
e¤ects on separation probability. Doubling the mean level of o¤shoring to China decreases
the likelihood of employment by 0.9 percent in period t+2 and the same relative increase
in import competition increases the likelihood by 2.5 percent. These results suggest that,
for an equally large relative change in the two measures of importing, Chinese import
competition causes a more profound restructuring of employment within rms than rms
own o¤shoring to China.
To analyse whether o¤shored job tasks tend to be carried out by low-, medium- or
high-skilled workers, we next estimate the e¤ects of o¤shoring separately for workers with
di¤erent educational skills. Table 2 reports the results on the e¤ects of o¤shoring and
import competition on employment for workers in the three educational groups.35 The
FE-IV estimation results in columns 5 to 7 suggest that the e¤ect of o¤shoring is negative
and larger than in the xed e¤ect estimations (columns 1 to 3) in all skill groups. Con-
sistent with the FE-results, o¤shoring has the largest negative e¤ect on the probability of
remaining employed in the same rm (Panel A) for the medium- and high-skilled groups.
35See Section 4.1. for the denitions.
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Doubling the mean o¤shoring to China increases the risk of separation from initial rm
by 6.9 percent, and the risk of non-employment by 2.2 percent for medium skilled in t+2.
The e¤ects are smaller for the low-skilled workers (2.9 respective 1.3 percent in t + 2).
O¤shoring also increases the separation risk for high-skilled workers (4.3 percent in t+2),
but has none or a considerably smaller negative impact on the probability of being em-
ployed. Thus, this suggests that the high-skilled workers are more likely to move to a new
employment after leaving their initial employer. This could be explained by the fact that
high-skilled have a higher propensity to leave voluntarily and even when forced to leave,
they may have better labour market outcomes than medium- and low-skilled workers.
Table 2 here
Import competition may also have a di¤erential impact on workers in di¤erent skill
groups: production that faces higher import competition may use workers with certain
skills more intensively and the way rms respond to the shock may a¤ect a certain type
of workers more profoundly. The results from the FE estimations in Panels C and D
in Table 2 indicate that increased import competition is associated with a higher risk of
separation and non-employment, especially for medium- and high-skilled workers. The
e¤ect of overall Chinese import competition on the risk of job loss and non-employment
is negative in most specications and has the largest impact for medium-skilled workers.
Doubling the mean level of import competition from China increases the risk of separation
from the initial rm by 11.2 percent for medium-skilled, 4.3 percent for low-skilled and
0.8 for high-skilled workers within two years. However, the impact of import competition
from China on the risk of non-employment is smaller for low-skilled (1.7 percent) than for
medium- (3.7 percent) and high-skilled workers (2.7 percent) in period t+ 2:
Table 3 and Figure 4 here
Finally, we analyse how the e¤ects vary by occupation. As we argued before, educa-
tional skills may be too crude a measure for dening the o¤shorability of jobs and their
sensitivity to import competition. We use occupational categories as a proxy for the task
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content of the jobs. Figure 4 shows the FE-IV results in a dynamic view by plotting the
e¤ect of o¤shoring on the risk of job loss and nonemployment by occupational categories in
year t, t+1 and t+2. The results are also reported in Table 3 together with the rst-stage
FE-IV and the FE estimation results.36 As seen in the upper panel of Figure 4, the results
indicate that increases in o¤shoring increase the risk of job loss and non-employment for
almost all worker types, especially for Operators and assemblers and Professional workers.
Workers in Clerk, Service and Trades and construction occupations have also an increased
probability of leaving the initial rm but the risk of non-employment is almost una¤ected
by o¤shoring. For Operators and assemblers, doubling o¤shoring increases the probability
of job loss by 11.4 percent, and the probability of non-employment by 4.9 percent within
two years. For Professional workers, the same change in o¤shoring increases the proba-
bility of job loss by 4.2 percent and the probability of non-employment by -0.4 percent
within two years.
In lower panel of Figure 4, we report the FE-IV results of import competition on
worker outcomes. Once more, the results indicate the largest risk of separation from the
initial rm for Operators and assemblers and Professional workers. Doubling the mean
level of import competition increases the probability of separation within two years by
11.0 percent and the probability of non-employment by 3.9 percent for Operators and
assemblers. For Professional workers, we are not able to compare the e¤ects of import
competition and o¤shoring reported in Table 3 since the rst stage is not signicant for
the instrumental variable of import competition. When using an alternative instrument,
we nd the comparable e¤ects of import competition on the probabilities of separation and
non-employment to be 13.9 percent and 2.2 in period t+2 for Professional workers.37 Thus,
for Operators and assemblers, the e¤ect of industry-level import competition is relatively
36The FE results indicate that growth in o¤shoring is associated with a higher risk of separation and
nonemployment for Trades and construction workers, and for Professionals. The risk of nonemployment
increases also for Operators and assemblers.
37The alternative instrument is dened as
CESEUkjt
WESkjt
, where CESEUkjt ;is Chinas export supply of products
k from industry j (three-digit NACE rev 1.1) in year t to EU countries excluding the supply to Finland
and WESkjt is the sum of the world export supply of products k from industry j. The rst stage is
signicant and the second-stage estimates are -0.079 (0.040) for same rm employment and -0.016 (0.005)
for employment in period t+ 2:
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similar to the e¤ect of rm-level o¤shoring (when comparing a similar percentage increase
in the mean), while for Professional workers import competition seem to lead to a higher
risk of separation than o¤shoring.
We may conclude that the e¤ects of o¤shoring and import competition on employment
outcomes are heterogenous; the groups that su¤er the most are the medium skilled, and
workers in production occupations, such as Operators and assemblers and Trades and
construction workers. Low-skilled workers in Clerk, Service and Trades and construction
occupations, who carry out routine manual and cognitive job tasks to a larger extent, face
also an increased risk of job loss but not of remaining non-employed. The results in Tables
1 to 3 and Figure 4 suggest that the two measures have a similar pattern of impacts on
employment outcomes. However, the e¤ect of import competition on the risk of job loss
and non-employment is larger in magnitude than the e¤ect of o¤shoring.
The question is whether the e¤ects found are economically signicant. A one-hundred
percent increase in the mean values of o¤shoring and import competition (0.45 and 1.25,
respectively) is relatively large. A comparison should be made of the fact that during the
period studied from 2001 to 2007, the mean value of o¤shoring to China increased from
0.13 to 0.86 and the mean value of import competition from China increased from 0.87
to 1.70. However, there is a large variation in the measures suggesting that some rms
and industries experienced quite large changes while other rms and industries remained
una¤ected.38
5.2 Earnings Outcomes
We argued earlier that trade shocks are more likely to have an impact on employment
rather than earnings in the short run in a country like Finland where the labour markets are
characterized by centralized and slow wage adjustments, but a relatively weak employment
protection. A limitation of the employment variables is that they only measure outcome
on the extensive margin, while adjustment to trade shocks could also take place on the
intensive margin, both in the number of hours worked and wages. To address this issue,
38Standard deviation and max value equal to 1.689 and 252.33 for COFF, and 3.580 and 42.24 for CIP,
see Table A2 in the Appendix.
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we also use earnings as an outcome variable.
We use two earnings measures from two di¤erent data sources; 1) annual earnings,
which come from the same data as the employment measures (FLEED) and include all
observations, even individuals with zero earnings; and 2) hourly wage which comes from
Structure of Earnings data from Statistics Finland and has a large coverage of workers
employed in private and public sectors, but does not include all workers.39 The annual
earnings variable has the advantage that it captures employment changes on the intensive
margin as changes in the hours worked, but it also has the disadvantage of mixing employ-
ment and wage changes. Hourly wage, on the other hand, is a precise measure of earnings
for employed workers, but we can only observe this outcome conditional on employment.
Our strategy is to relate exogenous changes in o¤shoring and import competition to
changes in labour incomes, after controlling for the worker-initial rm xed e¤ects and time
varying characteristics of the worker. More specically, we replace the outcome variable
Yit+k with a labour income measure in specication (3) in Section 4.3.. In the estimations
using annual earnings, we include all workers who were initially employed in the rms,
that is, even the displaced workers with no labour incomes and in estimations using hourly
wage, we include workers employed in the initial rm or all workers who remain employed.
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the total sample of workers.40 The FE-
estimates in Panel A indicate a positive but very small and not statistically signicant
e¤ect on the annual earnings of the employees in t; t+1 and t+2:41 The FE-IV estimates
for o¤shoring are not signicant, indicating no earnings e¤ect of o¤shoring on average.
The FE-estimates in Panel B suggest that import competition is negatively but modestly
associated with the annual earnings, while the FE-IV model indicates no e¤ects. We
are not surprised to nd non-zero earnings e¤ects of importing for the total sample of
workers, considering that we found the e¤ects on employment outcomes to vary by skills
and occupations.
39Workers in rms with less than ve employees and workers in the private sector with an employment
spell starting or ending in the middle of a month, and workers with no employment are excluded.
40The rst-stage estimates are reported in Table B1 in Appendix B and are statistically signicant.
41Doubling the mean o¤shoring yields at most a 0.27% e¤ect. The percentage e¤ect is obtained by divid-
ing the e¤ect by mean earnings reported in Table A2 multiplied by 100 (207.2764*0.45/35023*100=0.27).
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Table 4 here
To analyze the heterogeneity in the e¤ects on earnings, we allow the coe¢ cients for
o¤shoring and import competition to di¤er for high-skilled workers and for workers in
production occupations (including Operators and Assemblers and Trades and Construction
workers). The estimates reported in Panel C in Table 4 suggest that the e¤ect of o¤shoring
on the annual earnings is positive for the employees with a tertiary education and negative
for the other employees. Doubling the mean level of the o¤shoring measure (an increase
from 0.45 to 0.9) increases the annual earnings of employees with a tertiary education by
1.1 percent in period t+ 2 (FE-IV estimates). The estimates in Panel D suggest that the
e¤ect of import competition is similar but the magnitude is considerably larger. Doubling
the mean level of the import competition measure (an increase from 1.25 to 2.50) increases
the annual earnings of employees with a tertiary education by 5.9 percent in period t+ 2.
In Panels E and F in Table 4, we report the results from estimations including inter-
action terms both for high-skilled workers and for workers in production occupations. As
expected, the estimates suggest that the production workers who su¤er the largest em-
ployment losses from increased o¤shoring and import competition, also su¤er the largest
earnings losses. A one-hundred percent increase in o¤shoring or import competition has
an equally large e¤ect, both reducing the annual earnings of workers in production occu-
pations by 2.6 percent in period t+ 2.
Next, we estimate the e¤ects on log hourly wages. We dene two sub-samples of
employees; 1) employees that remain employed in the initial rm and 2) the employees that
remain employed in the initial or some other rm. It is important to keep in mind that both
of these groups are selected: workers who remain employed despite the trade shocks are
likely to di¤er from other workers hit by the shock also by unobservables. Those separating
and nding employment in other rms may also be di¤erent. The separation could be
voluntary, and even in the case that it is not voluntary, the workers who immediately
nd a new employment constitute a selective group as compared to the excluded group of
workers with no labour incomes.
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Table 5 reports the results for the FE-IV estimations with log hourly wage as an
outcome variable.42 43 The results in Panel A show that the e¤ect of o¤shoring on wages
is positive for the workers with a tertiary education. Since the dependent variable is in
log-form, the estimates in Table 5 express the e¤ect for a one-percentage point increase in
the o¤shoring or import competition measure. However, to make the results comparable
with the results in Table 4, we compute the e¤ects for the same magnitude of a change,
that is, a-hundred percent increase in the mean value of the respective measure. Doubling
the mean value of o¤shoring increases the wages of the employees with a tertiary education
who remain in the initial rm by 0.59 percent in period t + 2. Panel B shows that the
impact of import competition is also positive for workers with a tertiary education but
the e¤ects are larger than for o¤shoring. Doubling the mean level of import competition
increases the wages of the employees with tertiary education by 5.5 percent in period t+2.
Table 5 here
The e¤ects are almost the same for those workers who remain employed in the initial
rm and those workers who remain employed. Once more, both the workers remaining in
the initial rms and those moving to employment in new rms are likely to be a selected
sample of all workers hit by trade shocks. Thus, the positive e¤ect of o¤shoring on wages
of both these groups of workers could be due to positive productivity e¤ects of o¤shoring
but also due to the selection of high-skilled workers who remain in the rms.
Panel C and D in Table 5 show the results for the estimations including the interaction
for workers with a production occupation. As in Table 4, the results suggest wage losses
for this category of workers even when they remain employed in the initial rm or in
some rm. Doubling the mean value of o¤shoring reduces the wages of the employees
42The specication with log hourly wage as the dependent variable, including the workers who remain
employed in the same rm and estimating the e¤ects in period t; is similar to the main specications in
Hummels et al. (2014). However, the magnitude of the estimated e¤ect of o¤shoring on the log hourly
wage of workers with tertiary education is not directly comparable to the results of Hummels et al., since
our o¤shoring variable includes only imports from China and is not in log form. We dene the o¤shoring
variable in non-logged form in order to include zero observations in the estimations.
43The rst-stage estimates are statistically signicant and the F-statistics for weak instrument test high
(see Table B1 in Appendix B). The results from FE-estimations are not reported but are available upon
request.
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with production occupation by 1.1 percent in period t + 2 for the workers who remain
employed in the same rm and slightly more for workers who remain employed in some
rm. The e¤ect of doubling the mean value of import competition has a slightly larger
e¤ect than o¤shoring; 1.4 percent in period t+ 2 for those workers who remain employed
in the same rm. The results for wage outcomes are in line with the results from Hummels
et al. (2014) who also nd positive wage e¤ects of o¤shoring for highly skilled workers
remaining in the o¤shoring rms.44
5.3 Other Measures, Outcomes and Specications
We have shown that both o¤shoring and import competition increase the separation prob-
ability and the risk of non-employment for all worker types, while the wage e¤ects are
modest. In this section, we analyse the sensitivity of our results to di¤erent specications
and results.
In the section for employment outcomes, we estimated the e¤ects on two main employ-
ment outcome variables; the likelihood of remaining employed in the initial rm and the
likelihood of being employed. Our data allows us to distinguish additional employment
outcomes among workers switching employers; 1) employment in a di¤erent rm in the
same manufacturing industry, 2) employment in a di¤erent manufacturing industry, and
3) employment in non-manufacturing industry. We also estimate the e¤ects of o¤shoring
and import competition on these employment outcomes also. We nd no statistically sig-
nicant e¤ects, which may be explained by the fact that the shares of workers in these
three destinations are small.45
The increase in the Chinese import penetration could coincide with other changes
in low-income imports that explain the found e¤ects on employment and earnings. For
instance, Chinese imports could have crowded out imports from other important low-
income source countries. The descriptive evidence in Section 4 did not suggest any clear
44Note that the magnitude of the estimated e¤ect of o¤shoring on the log hourly wage of workers is not
directly comparable with the results of Hummels et al., since our o¤shoring variable only includes imports
from China and is not in log-form (does not exclude zero observations).
45The mean propabilities for these additional employment outcomes are reported in Table A2 in the
Appendix. The estimation results are available upon request.
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reallocation of imports from other low-income countries to China, but the evidence showed
that there has been a strong increase in the imports from Russia. To check the robustness
of the found e¤ects to some other simultaneous changes in imports from low and lower-
middle income countries, we construct measures of o¤shoring and import competition for
low and lower-middle income countries excluding and including China and estimate our
main model using these measures.46 We use these alternative measures only in the xed
e¤ect estimations, since we do not have a separate instrumental variable for lower-income
country imports (see Table A2 for variable descriptives).
In Table B2 in Appendix B, we report the xed-e¤ect estimation results for a specica-
tion including separate measures of o¤shoring and import competition for Chinese imports
and imports from all other lower-income countries. The estimates in Panel A suggest that
o¤shoring to all lower-income countries, including China, is negatively associated with the
probability of remaining employed in the same rm, but the estimates are not statistically
signicant. In Panel B, we include separate measures for o¤shoring to China and to other
low-income countries. The estimates for the o¤shoring to China measure (COFFijt) are
similar to the estimates in Table 1, while o¤shoring to other low-income countries has a
positive sign or is not statistically di¤erent from zero.
The estimates in Panel C and D for the import competition measure suggest a similar
pattern of results: import competition from all lower-income countries, including China,
is negatively associated with the probability of being employed in the same rm, and
remaining employed but the estimates are statistically signicant only in period t.47 When
we include separate measures for import competition from China and from all other lower-
income countries, the estimates for the measure of Chinese import competition remain
almost unchanged as compared to Table 1 while import competition from other countries
has a positive sign or is not statistically di¤erent from zero. In sum, these additional
results provide further evidence that o¤shoring to China and import competition from
46We dene the group of low and lower-middle income countries by the denitions of the World Bank
for 2001.
47Import competition measures for low-income countries (with or without China) are constructed in
the same way as CIP ijt measure, deducting rms own low-income country imports from industrys total
low-income country imports and dividing this di¤erence by the sum of industrys total imports and output
(see equation 2).
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China rather than changes in the imports from other low-income countries explain our
main results. Mion and Zhu (2013) also nd that China is di¤erent from both other low-
wage countries and its separate inclusion in the analysis brings out results not found for
total imports.
In all models, we have controlled for worker-base year xed e¤ects. To analyse whether
o¤shoring rms and rms in import competing industries are di¤erent, we report the re-
sults without individual-base -year-rm (initial job spell) xed e¤ects. The results reported
in Panel A of Table B3 in Appendix B show that workers in rms with a higher level of
o¤shoring have a higher risk of separating from these rms between t   1 and t, thus
indicating that these rms have a higher turnover. When including rm xed e¤ects, and
thus controlling for permanent di¤erences between rms, the negative coe¢ cient becomes
smaller and less precise. There is no di¤erence between the results when controlling for
rm xed e¤ects and for rm-individual xed e¤ects (which is the specication reported
in our main tables). Panel B reports the results for import competition. The specica-
tion without xed e¤ects indicates a negative association with import competition and
probability of being employed in base-year rm, or in general. When including rm, or
rm-individual xed e¤ects, the results become more negative and signicant, indicat-
ing that growth in import competition is associated with a higher risk of job loss and
nonemployment.
6 Conclusions
Chinas transition to a more market-oriented economy has made a profound change in
the world economy and trade. In this paper, we study the consequences of increased
Chinese import penetration for employment and earnings of individuals working in the
manufacturing sector of a small open economy, namely Finland.
We contribute to the existing literature on employment and earnings e¤ects of im-
porting by distinguishing between the e¤ects of an import shock on nal product demand
(import competition) and an import shock on the rms own use of intermediates (o¤-
shoring intermediate inputs), and by focusing on worker-level outcomes by worker types.
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To nd the causal relationships from import shocks to employment and wages, we exploit
the relative increase in Chinese exports to EU following the changes in trade policies be-
tween EU and China due to the Chinese WTO entry 2001 and the ending of the quota
system due to the Multiber Arrangement in 2005.
We nd that both o¤shoring and import competition increase the overall probability
of an individual leaving her initial employer, and the probability of being non-employed
after a separation from the initial rm, but the latter e¤ect is statistically less precise.
Distinguishing workers by educational skills shows that the e¤ects of import competition
and o¤shoring on employment are not uniform. Imports from China increase the proba-
bility of separation from the initial employer the most for workers with medium and high
educational skills, but also for workers with the lowest educational skills. In terms of
overall employment, high-skilled workers seem to fare better in the labour market than
medium- or low-skilled, as suggested by the smaller e¤ects of o¤shoring on the risk of
non-employment for the high-skilled.
We further scrutinize the impact of importing for workers by occupation. We nd that
Operators and assemblers face both an increased probability of separation from the initial
rm and non-employment caused by o¤shoring and import competition. Professionals
is another occupational group for which rm-level o¤shoring increases the probablity of
leaving the initial rm. However, this group of workers seems to become re-employed in
other rms more frequently than production workers as indicated by a considerably smaller
risk of non-employment in the short term. Our ndings thus suggest that o¤shoring of jobs
that are intensive in routine tasks may have contributed to the polarization of employment
by reducing job opportunities in middle-skilled production and operative occupations.
We rst focused on employment outcomes arguing that trade shocks are more likely
to impact employment rather than earnings in the short run in Finland where wage ad-
justments are slow but employment protection is relatively weak. Since the employment
variables only capture outcomes on the extensive margin, we also use earnings as an out-
come variable to capture the adjustments on the intensive margin, both in the number
of hours worked and wages. Distinguishing workers by educational skills suggests that
o¤shoring and import competition have a positive e¤ect on the annual labour income and
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the hourly wage of high-skilled workers and a negative e¤ect on the earnings outcomes of
the other workers. Further, we nd that production workers, who were most adversely
a¤ected by o¤shoring and import competition in terms of employment, also su¤er the
largest earnings and wage losses due to Chinese imports.
Previous literature suggests that while import competition is expected to crowd out
domestic production, the e¤ect of imported intermediates on domestic production is am-
biguous. In this paper, we nd that both import competition and o¤shoring increase the
risk of separation and non-employment. The results for o¤shoring are consistent with an
increased use of imported intermediates substituting for domestic production which uses
medium-skilled workers, in particular for production workers, intensively, thereby causing
displacements and lower wages for these workers. However, the results do not exclude the
possibility of a productivity e¤ect of o¤shoring, which could explain the positive e¤ect
on the earnings of the high skilled. The ndings are consistent with negative substitu-
tion and demand e¤ects dominating the wage outcomes for production workers, but the
positive wage e¤ect on the high skilled cannot only be accredited to a productivity ef-
fect of o¤shoring since import competition has a similar e¤ect on the wages of the high
skilled. Other explanations are provided by Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2016) who
showed an increased import competition from China to cause an increased technological
change within rms and a reallocation of employment towards more technologically ad-
vanced rms, leading to a fall in employment for low-skilled workers, and Mion and Zhu
(2013) who nd industry-level import competition from China to induce skill upgrading
in low-tech manufacturing industries. These shifts in the relative demand of skills due
to Chinese import competition could explain the positive wage e¤ects for the high skilled
that we nd in our study.
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Chinese import penetration and manufacturing employment in Finland and USA 1990-2009. 
    Source: Computed from OECD Stan database. 
 
Figure 2. Import shares from the most important low-and middle-income countries. 
Source: Computed from data of Finnish Customs. 
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Figure 3. Change (2001-2007) and level (2007) of imports from China and Russia by industry. 
 
Figure 4. Effect of offshoring or import competition on employment outcomes, by occupation. 
    Notes: Each panel plots regression coefficients and 90 % confidence intervals obtained from separate IV regressions 
for each time period and occupational group. The coefficients and standard errors are also reported in table 3.  
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Table 1. The effect of offshoring and import competition on employment, FE and FE-IV estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Same firm employment 
FE (1) (2) (3) FE-IV (4) Second 
stage 
(5) (6) (7) 
Time Period t t+1 t+2 First stage  t t+1 t+2 
PANEL A           
COFFijt -0.0063 -0.0150 -0.0110* CRES_INPjt 14.8173*** COFFijt 0.0018 -0.0711*** -0.0768*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)  (3.353)  (0.016) (0.019) (0.025) 
R-squared 0.103 0.175 0.221  0.1649  0.1022 0.1441 0.1835 
PANEL  B          
CIPijt -0.0079** -0.0069* -0.0036 CRES_INDjt 13.8353** CIPijt 0.0032 -0.0714* -0.0774* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)  (5.569)  (0.019) (0.041) (0.040) 
R-squared 0.104 0.173 0.221  0.124  0.1012 0.1093 0.1453 
PANEL  C          
COFFijt -0.0054 -0.0143 -0.0106*       
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)       
CIPijt -0.0075** -0.0059 -0.0028       
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)       
R-squared 0.104 0.175 0.222       
 Employment 
FE (1) (2) (3) FE-IV (4) Second 
stage 
(5) (6) (7) 
Time Period t t+1 t+2 First stage COFF t t+1 t+2 
PANEL D          
COFFijt 0.0009 -0.0019 -0.0012 CRES_INPjt 14.8173*** COFFijt -0.0034 -0.0117 -0.0186 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  (3.353)  (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) 
R-squared 0.041 0.037 0.051  0.1649  0.0401 0.0340 0.0441 
PANEL  E          
CIPijt -0.0028*** -0.0023** -0.0015 CRES_INDjt 13.8353** CIPijt -0.0032 -0.0116 -0.0184** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (5.569)  (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
R-squared 0.041 0.037 0.051  0.124  0.0412 0.0330 0.0409 
PANEL  F          
COFFijt 0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0011       
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)       
CIPijt -0.0029*** -0.0021** -0.0014       
 (0.001) (0.0011) (0.001)       
R-squared 0.041 0.037 0.051       
Observations 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201  1,511,201  1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 
No of worker-firm 
fe 
344,866 344,866 344,866  344,866  344,866 344,866 344,866 
Notes: Columns 1-3 present the results from separate worker-level FE regressions and columns 5-7 from separate FE-IV regressions, using either employment in the same firm as in period  
t-1 or any employment as dependent variables. China offshoring (COFF) is instrumented by using China export supply weighted with input structure (CRES-INPjt) and China import 
competition is instrumented by using China export supply (CRES-INDjt). All specifications include control variables: number of children under 7 (and an interaction with female), number 
of children under 18 (and interaction with female), age, age2, tenure (2, 3, 4-10, >10 years) and log firm size in period t-1. Individual-base-year-firm and year fixed effects are included. 
Robust standard errors clustered at base-year-firm level are reported in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2. The effect of offshoring and import competition on employment by education, FE and FE-IV estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
  FE (1) (2) (3) IV FE 1st  st. (4)  IV FE 2nd  st. (5) (6) (7) 
   Same firm employment    Same firm employment 
PANEL A Observations#  t t+1 t+2  COFFijt  t t+1 t+2 
 
Low Educated  COFFijt -0.0032 -0.0063 -0.0043 CRES_INPjt 13.1999*** COFFijt -0.0028 -0.0413** -0.0457** 
 291,364    (0.0033) (0.0059) (0.0039)  (3.4365)  (0.0117) (0.0199) (0.0232) 
Medium  Educated   -0.0018 -0.0092 -0.0081*  11.3249***  -0.0201 -0.0889** -0.1106** 
 747,640  (0.0034) (0.0061) (0.0046)  (3.0123)  (0.0223) (0.0387) (0.0491) 
High Educated   -0.0091* -0.0194* -0.0140**  17.3977***  0.0162 -0.0671*** -0.0673*** 
 468,653  (0.0050) (0.0101) (0.0071)  (2.5901)  (0.0137) (0.0114) (0.0148) 
PANEL B   Employment      Employment   
   t t+1 t+2   COFFijt  t t+1 t+2 
 
Low Educated  COFFijt -0.0010 -0.0022* -0.0019* CRES_INPjt 13.1999*** COFFijt -0.0127** -0.0172 -0.0246* 
 291,364    (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0011)  (3.4365)  (0.0055) (0.0105) (0.0136) 
Medium  Educated   0.0007 -0.0038 -0.0031*  11.3249***  -0.0166 -0.0308 -0.0454* 
 747,640  (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0016)  (3.0123)  (0.0126) (0.0221) (0.0272) 
High Educated   0.0010 -0.0016 -0.0014***  17.3977***  0.0030 -0.0034 -0.0092* 
 468,653  (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0005)  (2.5901)  (0.0042) (0.0050) (0.0054) 
PANEL C   Same firm employment    Same firm employment
   t t+1 t+2    CIPijt 
 
 t t+1 t+2 
Low Educated  CIPijt -0.0033 -0.0023 -0.0000 CRES_INDjt 23.4424*** CIPijt -0.0040 -0.0238 -0.0244* 
 291,364    (0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0038)  (5.6387)  (0.0065) (0.0150) (0.0146) 
Medium  Educated   -0.0078** -0.0083* -0.0045  18.2912***  -0.0126 -0.0515* -0.0647** 
 747,640  (0.0031) (0.0044) (0.0044)  (4.6571)  (0.0108) (0.0269) (0.0303) 
High Educated   -0.0104** -0.0072** -0.0044  7.4734*  -0.0104** -0.0072** -0.0044 
 468,653  (0.0045) (0.0035) (0.0037)  (4.4688)  (0.0045) (0.0035) (0.0037) 
PANEL D   Employment   Employment 
   t t+1 t+2  CIPijt 
 
 t t+1 t+2 
Low Educated  CIPijt -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0007 CRES_INDjt 23.4424*** CIPijt -0.0073*** -0.0100* -0.0121** 
 291,364    (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0012)  (5.6387)  (0.0025) (0.0054) (0.0060) 
Medium  Educated   -0.0036*** -0.0030** -0.0012  18.2912***  -0.0095* -0.0178* -0.0268** 
 747,640  (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012)  (4.6571)  (0.0052) (0.0105) (0.0116) 
High Educated   -0.0021** -0.0017** -0.0022***  7.4734*  0.0075 -0.0066 -0.0203** 
 468,653  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)  (4.4688)  (0.0136) (0.0076) (0.0090) 
Notes: Columns 1-3 present the results from separate worker-level FE regressions, column 4 the first-stage results from separate FE-IV regressions and regressions and columns 5-7 the second-stage results from separate  FE-IV regressions  by 
education groups. See text under Table 1. # Number of observations each period. 
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Table 3. The effect of offshoring and import competition on employment by occupation, FE and FE-IV estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
COFFijt Clerk Service Operators and 
assemblers 
Trades and constr. 
work. 
Professionals Managerial 
Panel A Same firm employment          
 FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV 
t -0.0017 0.0168* 0.0018 -0.0293* -0.0008 -0.0661** -0.0002 0.0058 -0.0099* 0.0209 -0.0039 0.0615*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0100) (0.0015) (0.0175) (0.0025) (0.0297) (0.0056) (0.0283) (0.0059) (0.0150) (0.0037) (0.0199) 
t+1 -0.0080 -0.0574*** 0.0003 -0.0086 -0.0069 -0.1581** -0.0087 -0.0146 -0.0219* -0.0689*** -0.0094* 0.0426*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0149) (0.0025) (0.0211) (0.0047) (0.0621) (0.0083) (0.0487) (0.0113) (0.0118) (0.0057) (0.0124) 
t+2 -0.0081 -0.0646*** 0.0017 -0.0131 -0.0082 -0.1848** -0.0099** -0.0657* -0.0154** -0.0668*** -0.0059 -0.0296*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0168) (0.0026) (0.0233) (0.0053) (0.0736) (0.0048) (0.0382) (0.0076) (0.0138) (0.0039) (0.0113) 
Panel B Employment            
 FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV 
t 0.0005 0.0036 -0.0002 0.0037 -0.0002 -0.0404*** 0.0008 -0.0229 0.0013** 0.0019 0.0013** 0.0027 
 (0.0008) (0.0059) (0.0008) (0.0054) (0.0017) (0.0151) (0.0037) (0.0164) (0.0006) (0.0034) (0.0006) (0.0036) 
t+1 -0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0065 -0.0043* -0.0721** -0.0046 0.0020 -0.0018** -0.0040 -0.0026** 0.0005 
 (0.0012) (0.0030) (0.0016) (0.0097) (0.0026) (0.0320) (0.0035) (0.0326) (0.0008) (0.0032) (0.0011) (0.0029) 
t+2 -0.0013 -0.0086* 0.0006 -0.0106 -0.0044* -0.0789** -0.0054** -0.0536 -0.0020*** -0.0084*** -0.0008 -0.0083** 
 (0.0011) (0.0046) (0.0013)) (0.0110) (0.0025) (0.0359) (0.0025) (0.0334) (0.0007) (0.0029) (0.0007) (0.0039) 
First stage  16.7056***  16.9564***  9.0445***  7.9374***  17.3370***  13.2444*** 
CRESINPjt  (3.7737)  (5.0849)  (1.8567)  (2.5768)  (2.4209)  (2.5875) 
CIPijt Clerk Service Operators and 
assemblers 
Trades and constr. 
work. 
Professionals Managerial 
Panel C Same firm employment          
 FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV 
t -0.0053** 0.0249 -0.0013 0.0216* -0.0087** -0.0268** -0.0062** 0.0007 -0.0110** 0.0780 -0.0057* 0.0530 
 (0.0027) (0.0261) (0.0024) (0.0128) (0.0040) (0.0115) (0.0026) (0.0116) (0.0052) (0.0977) (0.0034) (0.0555) 
t+1 -0.0036 -0.0623 -0.0007 -0.0065 -0.0111* -0.0571** -0.0029 -0.0100 -0.0059* -0.1772 -0.0029 -0.0386 
 (0.0025) (0.0459) (0.0028) (0.0147) (0.0062) (0.0290) (0.0028) (0.0190) (0.0031) (0.1306) (0.0021) (0.0341) 
t+2 -0.0035 -0.0824 0.0024 -0.0085 -0.0069 -0.0640* -0.0006 -0.0330* -0.0028 -0.1758 -0.0008 -0.0262 
 (0.0034) (0.0528) (0.0033) (0.0160) (0.0063) (0.0334) (0.0027) (0.0197) (0.0034) (0.1232) (0.0024) (0.0243) 
Panel D Employment            
 FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV FE FE-IV 
t -0.0026** 0.0056 -0.0024** 0.0039 -0.0034** -0.0152** -0.0041** -0.0100* -0.0019*** 0.0066 -0.0005 0.0018 
 (0.0010) (0.0097) (0.0012) (0.0042) (0.0015) (0.0060) (0.0018) (0.0051) (0.0007) (0.0131) (0.0006) (0.0042) 
t+1 -0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0026 -0.0040** -0.0268* -0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0011* -0.0091* -0.0003 0.0002 
 (0.0010) (0.0036) (0.0010) (0.0058) (0.0018) (0.0139) (0.0008) (0.0101) (0.0006) (0.0052) (0.0008) (0.0025) 
t+2 -0.0006 -0.0114* 0.0009 -0.0040 -0.0018 -0.0280* -0.0004 -0.0247*** -0.0018** -0.0222* 0.0003 -0.0047 
 (0.0015) (0.0063) (0.0012) (0.0067) (0.0018) (0.0151) (0.0013) (0.0092) (0.0007) (0.0115) (0.0008) (0.0041) 
First stage  13.0556**  22.7005***  23.6699***  18.2052***  6.1196  15.1170* 
CRESINDjt  (6.4171)  (5.9466)  (5.8234)  (3.7810)  (3.9568)  (8.8054) 
obs 53,955  122,799  461,196  320,519  426,590  55,732   
Notes: Table 3 presents the results from separate worker-level FE regressions, and the first-stage and the second-stage results from separate FE-IV regressions by occupational groups. See text under 
Table 1 
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Table 4. The effect of offshoring and import competition on annual labor income, FE and FE-IV  estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 FE  FE-IV 
Time Period t t+1 t+2  t t+1 t+2 
PANEL A        
COFFijt 207.2764 199.6352 134.3398  83.9413 609.2829 41.6512 
 (137.145) (166.070) (130.942)  (153.274) (572.012) (708.330) 
PANEL B        
CIPijt -20.7707 -118.0665** -91.2247**  104.9369 623.3480 -55.5624 
 (34.961) (50.079) (42.631)  (144.629) (923.044) (715.811) 
PANEL C        
COFFijt -22.2425 -57.8619 -71.8127  -1,097.4325*** -1,066.8240 -1,687.3332* 
 (37.406) (53.063) (51.844)  (418.621) (876.272) (975.865) 
COFFijt * Tertiary edu 487.8933** 549.7088* 440.2913**  1,928.3605* 2,750.1957*** 2,839.7766*** 
(211.392) (285.826) (199.673)  (986.713) (934.756) (841.974) 
PANEL D        
CIPijt -153.2507*** -225.6320*** -164.3371***  -521.3241*** -394.1836 -889.1387** 
 (37.304) (64.460) (44.977)  (133.259) (445.607) (394.288) 
CIPijt * Tertiary edu 463.4259*** 376.7264*** 255.9808***  2,296.0869*** 3,772.0022** 3,091.7893* 
 (154.739) (97.023) (57.393)  (345.032) (1,891.445) (1,682.564) 
Observations 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201  1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 
PANEL E        
COFFijt 140.5644 132.6768 148.2672**  -284.0437 1.7265 -468.2525 
 (104.767) (89.057) (71.178)  (264.692) (526.196) (467.339) 
COFF ijt* Tertiary edu 345.2100** 411.8819* 300.1357*  1,190.4494 1,926.1872*** 1,944.3885*** 
 (143.869) (223.881) (175.319)  (862.552) (679.560) (471.663) 
COFFijt*Production 
occ 
-258.9288* -235.9597* -217.2282***  -1,297.7252*** -1,310.6143*** -1,200.3711*** 
 (138.859) (131.301) (71.388)  (204.8890) (259.0446) (379.9345) 
PANEL F        
CIPijt -22.3239 -87.3600** -68.0553**  -41.4781 393.0681 -102.4876 
 (25.434) (37.931) (31.753)  (138.524) (692.160) (434.450) 
CIPijt * Tertiary edu 385.0827*** 307.3921*** 217.8426***  1,924.7112*** 3,451.7624** 2,907.3849* 
 (135.513) (82.114) (51.230)  (340.671) (1,746.314) (1,673.105) 
CIPijt*Production occ -125.3086*** -128.9670*** -86.7801***  -497.2043*** -655.1439** -503.0991*** 
 (36.131) (29.257) (22.678)  (157.968) (313.447) (188.794) 
Observations 1,507,854 1,503,798 1,500,232  1,506,766 1,502,592 1,498,998 
Notes: Columns 1-3 present the results from separate worker-level FE regressions and columns 4-6 the results from the second-stage FE-IV regressions, 
using annual labor income as a dependent variable. The first-stage results are reported in Table B5 in Appendix B. All specifications include the same 
control variables as in Table 1. Individual-base-year-firm and year fixed effects are included. Offshoring (COFFijt) is instrumented using China export 
supply weighted with input structure (CRES-INPjt) and import competition (CIPijt) is instrumented using unweighted China export supply (CRES-INDjt). 
Robust standard errors clustered at base-year-firm level are reported in parentheses.*** ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. The effect of offshoring and import competition on (log) hourly wage, FE-IV estimations. 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Employed in the same firm  Employed 
Time Period t t+1 t+2  t t+1 t+2 
Panel A        
COFFijt -0.0092*** -0.0129** -0.0123  -0.0102*** -0.0150*** -0.0126 
 (0.0033) (0.0051) (0.0077)  (0.0033) (0.0056) (0.0096) 
COFFijt * Tertiary edu 0.0108** 0.0195* 0.0254**  0.0118** 0.0197* 0.0254** 
 (0.0048) (0.0104) (0.0105)  (0.0053) (0.0106) (0.0119) 
Panel B        
CIPijt -0.0063 -0.0082* -0.0075  -0.0070 -0.0107** -0.0064 
 (0.0048) (0.0042) (0.0048)  (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0064) 
CIPijt * Tertiary edu 0.0187** 0.0365*** 0.0517***  0.0191** 0.0361*** 0.0586*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0097) (0.0187)  (0.0086) (0.0089) (0.0213) 
Observations 980,061 868,418 747,677  1,024,069 978,851 932,902 
No of worker-firm fixed 
effects 
229,615 209,041 180,424  239,090 232,259 224,663 
Panel C        
COFFijt -0.0044 -0.0049 -0.0040  -0.0052* -0.0064** -0.0028 
 (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0043)  (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0048) 
COFFijt * Tertiary edu 0.0063* 0.0120* 0.0175***  0.0071* 0.0116** 0.0161** 
 (0.0035) (0.0071) (0.0067)  (0.0037) (0.0068) (0.0071) 
COFFijt*Production occ. -0.0106*** -0.0182*** -0.0201***  -0.0114*** -0.0203*** -0.0237*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0053) (0.0068)  (0.0024) (0.0062) (0.0084) 
Panel D        
CIPijt -0.0028 -0.0012 0.0010  -0.0031 -0.0028 0.0047 
 (0.0046) (0.0035) (0.0057)  (0.0045) (0.0038) (0.0091) 
CIPijt * Tertiary edu 0.0158* 0.0307*** 0.0448***  0.0159* 0.0297*** 0.0497*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0094) (0.0165)  (0.0084) (0.0086) (0.0183) 
CIPijt*Production occ. -0.0048*** -0.0097*** -0.0119***  -0.0053*** -0.0109*** -0.0153*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0039)  (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0056) 
Observations 980,061 868,418 747,677  1,024,069 978,851 932,902 
Notes:  Columns 1-3 present the results from separate worker-level FE regressions and columns 4-6 the results from the second-stage FE-IV regressions, 
using log hourly wage as a dependent variable.  The first-stage results are reported in Table B5 in Appendix B. All specifications include the same 
control variables as in Table 1. Individual-base-year-firm and year fixed effects are included. Offshoring (COFFijt) is instrumented using China export 
supply weighted with input structure (CRES-INPjt) and import competition (CIPijt) is instrumented using unweighted China export supply (CRES-INDjt)  
Robust standard errors clustered at base-year-firm level are in parentheses.*** ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Firm-level FE estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable log(empl) log (sales) export share high-skilled 
share 
medium-
skilled share 
low-skilled 
share 
COFFijt -0.0001 -0.0149*** -0.0011 0.00004 0.00004 -0.0008 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
R-squared 0.009 0.009 0.019 0.014 0.014 0.076 
Observations 20,484 20,484 20,484 20,484 20,484 20,484 
No of firms 3,882  3,882  3,882 3,882 3,882 3,882 
CIPijt -0.0116*** -0.0137*** -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
R-squared 0.011 0.090 0.019 0.026 0.014 0.076 
Observations 20,484 20,484 20,484 20,484 20,484 20,484 
No of firms 3,882  3,882  3,882 3,882 3,882 3,882 
Notes: All specifications include year and firm fixed effects.  Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2. Summary statistics: mean values for individual level analysis 
Lower Secondary Employed t-1 period firm .9253 .8196 .7112 
 Employed .9605 .9170 .8736 
 Annual earnings (real value) 29343.12 28710.43 27859.51 
 Log hourly wage* 2.632 2.652 2.672 
 N 291975 291975 291975 
Upper Secondary Employed t-1 period firm .9229 .8204 .7205 
 Employed .9671 .9376 .9097 
 Annual earnings (real value) 30579.32 30432.83 30095.53 
 Log hourly wage* 2.674 2.696 2.718 
 N 749592 749592 749592 
Tertiary Employed t-1 period firm .9137 .8073 .7092 
 Employed .9765 .9273 .9396 
 Annual earnings (real value) 45648.3 46289.62 46642.63 
 Log hourly wage* 2.929 2.959 2.989 
 N 469634 469634 469634 
Clerk Employed t-1 period firm .9194 .8120 .7120 
 Employed .9680 .9412 .9195 
 N 58922 58922 58922 
Service Employed t-1 period firm .9151 .8067 .7034 
 Employed .9621 .9267 .8933 
 N 132671 132671 132671 
Operators and Employed t-1 period firm .9284 .8277 .7274 
assemblers Employed .9642 .9299 .8979 
 N 474553 474553 474553 
Trades and  Employed t-1 period firm .9203 .8163 .7117 
Construction workers Employed .9654 .9336 .9014 
 N 334547 334547 334547 
Professional Employed t-1 period firm .9169 .8117 .7124 
 Employed .9776 .9574 .9377 
 N 438755 438755 438755 
Managerial Employed t-1 period firm .9075 .7968 .7021 
 Employed .9788 .9574 .9364 
 N 61481 61481 61481 
N  1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 
Notes: Data consist of all workers aged 20-55 years working in end of the years 2000-2006 (years t-1) in manufacturing firms. These workers are 
followed until year t+2, regardless whether they stay in their t-1 firms. The trade information is from year t (2001-2007). *Includes the same 
observations as in the regressions in Table 5. 
 
 
   
Outcome Variables Variable Time Period 
  t t+1 t+2 
All Employees Employed t-1 period firm .9205 .8162 .7152 
 Employed .9688 .9397 .9120 
 - different firm, same manufact. industry .0176 .0550 .0947 
 - different manufacturing industry  .0098 .0241 .0364 
 - non-manufacturing .0208 .0445 .0657 
 Annual earnings (real value) 35023.44 35027.84 34805.84 
 Log hourly wage* 16.3749 16.8094 17.2609 
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Table A2. Cont. 
Trade Measures Period t Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
 COFFijt (China Import/sales)% .4549 1.6895 0 252.3322 
 OFFijt (Total Import/sales)% 8.3414 26.9902 0 409.3564 
 CIPijt (firm-specific)% 1.2526 3.5796 0 42.42448 
 IPijt (firm-specific)% 19.9139 19.1516 0.8228 97.4334 
 LI-OFFijt (Low-income Import/sales)% 1.3070 3.5990 0 252.3322 
 LI-OFF-OTHERijt (Low-income Import 
excl. China/sales)% 
0.8521 3.0326 0 118.8611 
 LI-IPijt (Low-income, firm-specific)% 2.9716 5.6234 0.0005 52.4614 
 LI-IP-OTHERijt (Low-income excl. 
China, firm-specific)% 
1.7190 3.0485 0 30.2759 
Instruments      
 CRES_INPjt .0470 .0652 0.00005 .4856 
 CRES_INDjt .0476 .0662 0.00005 .4856 
Background Characteristics     
 Female .2922 .4548 0 1 
 Number of children under 7 .3159 .6612 0 8 
 Number of children under 18 0.8511 1.1131 0 14 
 Age 40.2623 9.1053 20 55 
 Export share .4140 0.5169 0 18.9224 
 log firm size (number of employees) 6.2519 1.9492 0 10.1252 
 Tenure 4.600 3.0528 1 10 
 Primary .1932 0.3948 0 1 
 Secondary .4960 0.5000 0 1 
 Tertiary .3108 0.4628 0 1 
 Clerk .0390 0.1936 0 1 
 Service .0878 0.2830 0 1 
 Trades and Construction .2214 0.4152 0 1 
 Operators and Assemblers .3140 0.4641 0 1 
 Professional .2903 0.4539 0 1 
 Managerial .0407 0.1978 0 1 
N  1,511,201    
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1. First stage results for regressions for annual labor income and hourly wage IV regressions. 
 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Specification Annual labor income  Log hourly wage 
PANEL A COFFijt       
        
CRES_INPjt 14.8173***       
 (3.3526)       
PANEL B CIPijt       
        
CRES_INDjt 13.8353**       
 (5.5629       
PANEL C COFFijt COFFijt*tertiary   COFFijt COFFijt*tertiary  
CRES_INPjt 11.3914*** -0.5162   11.9518*** -0.8868  
 (2.6843) (0.6861)   (2.9963) (0.9071)  
CRES_INPjt *tertiary 6.8502*** 19.0401***   7.1078*** 20.5800***  
 (1.2488) (3.6784)   (1.1222) (3.1535)  
PANEL D CIPijt CIPijt *tertiary   CIPijt CIPijt *tertiary  
CRES_INDjt 18.4786*** -1.4198***   14.0617*** -1.2654***  
 (5.0486) (0.3222)   (5.0420) (0.3621)  
CRES_INDjt *tertiary -9.4169*** 10.4027**   -8.7899*** 6.1317**  
 (1.8335) (4.6551)   (2.6340) (2.5148)  
Observations 1,511,3201 1,511,368   1,024,069 1,024,069  
PANEL E COFFijt COFFijt *tertiary COFFijt 
*production 
 COFFijt COFFijt *tertiary COFFijt 
*production 
CRES_INPjt 13.8446*** 0.1098 -0.9600*  14.9589*** -0.2376 -1.3924*** 
 (2.9675) (0.7346) (0.5296)  (2.9231) (1.0670) (0.5332) 
CRES_INPjt *tertiary -4.6348*** 18.4700*** 0.7358*  4.3987*** 19.9965*** 0.9752** 
 (1.3162) (3.6988) (0.4049)  (1.2999) (3.2985) (0.4713) 
CRES_INPjt*production -3.8179*** -0.9669*** 10.3479***  -4.8619*** -1.0476*** 11.4866*** 
 (1.0130) (0.1926) (1.7721)  (0.8455) (0.2008) (2.1859) 
PANEL F CIPijt CIPijt *tertiary CIPijt 
*production 
 CIPijt CIPijt *tertiary CIPijt 
*production 
CRES_INDjt 16.4128*** -2.0495*** -4.2404  12.0506** -1.6601*** -1.1967 
 (5.2197) (0.3107) (3.7356)  (4.8281) (0.2553) (3.0589) 
CRES_INDjt *tertiary -7.4887*** 11.0193** 3.8495  -6.9556*** 6.4936** 1.0762 
 (1.4547) (4.9177) (3.0304)  (2.3106) (2.8212) (2.5847) 
CRES_INDjt*production 3.1812** 0.9457** 28.9163***  3.2195** 0.6344 19.8701*** 
 (1.5422) (0.4325) (6.9289)  (1.3655) (0.5052) (6.7349) 
Observations 1,506,766 1,506,766 1,506,766  1,024,069 1,024,069 1,024,069 
Notes: Table B1 presents the results from the first-stage of worker-level FE-IV regressions, using either annual labor income or log hourly wage as 
dependent variables. All specifications include the same control variables as in Table 1. Individual-base-year-firm and year fixed effects are included. 
COFFijt is instrumented using China export supply weighted with input structure (CES_INPjt) and CIPijt is instrumented using unweighted China export 
supply (CES_INDjt).  Robust standard errors clustered at base-year-firm level are in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B3. The effect of offshoring and import competition on employment and earnings- OLS and firm- FE.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Same firm employment at t Employment at t 
Panel A OLS firm FE individual-
firm FE 
OLS firm FE individual-firm 
FE 
COFFijt -0.0077* -0.0086 -0.0063 -0.0018*** 0.0001 0.0009 
 (0.0040) (0.0076) (0.0049) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0012) 
Observations 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 
R-squared 0.0318 0.0811 0.1031 0.0155 0.0383 0.0408 
Panel B  Same firm employment at t Employment at t 
 OLS firm FE individual-
firm FE 
OLS firm FE individual-firm 
FE 
CIPijt -0.0027** -0.0118** -0.0113** -0.0009*** -0.0020*** -0.0022** 
 (0.0012) (0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0010) 
Observations 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 
R-squared 0.0309 0.0831 0.1057 0.0156 0.0385 0.0411 
Notes: Table B3 presents the results from OLS regressions, using either employment in the same firm or any employment in period t as 
dependent variables. All specifications include the same control variable as in Table 1. Year fixed effects are included. In columns 2 and 5 
also base-year-firm fixed effects are included and in columns 3 and 6 individual-base-year-firm fixed effects are included. Robust standard 
errors clustered at base-year-firm level are in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Same firm employment Employment 
Time Period t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 
PANEL A       
LI-OFFijt 0.00009 -0.0035 -0.0041 0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0015* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R-squared 0.103 0.173 0.221 0.041 0.037 0.051 
PANEL B       
COFFijt -0.0060 -0.0147 -0.0109* 0.0010 -0.0020 -0.0013 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
LI-OFF-OTHERijt 0.0044* 0.0044 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0016 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
R-squared 0.104 0.175 0.221 0.041 0.037 0.051 
PANEL C       
LI-IPijt -0.0035* -0.0027 0.0001 -0.0016** -0.0012* -0.0003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
R-squared 0.103 0.173 0.220 0.041 0.037 0.051 
PANEL D       
CIPijt -0.0082** -0.0073* -0.0042 -0.0029*** -0.0023** -0.0016 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LI-IP-OTHERijt 0.0037** 0.0044 0.0069** 0.0005 0.0006 0.0016* 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
R-squared 0.104 0.174 0.221 0.041 0.037 0.051 
Obs. 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 1,511,201 
Notes: Table B2 presents the results from worker-level FE regressions, using either employment in the same firm or any employment as dependent 
variables. All specifications include the same control variables as in Table 1. Individual-base-year-firm and year fixed effects are included. LI-OFFijt and  
LI-IPijt include imports low and lower middle income countries including China and LI-OFF-OTHERijt and LI-IP-OTHERijt excluding China. Robust 
standard errors clustered at base-year-firm level are in parentheses.  ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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